Wednesday, December 10, 2014

FALL 2014 Lectures Series (No.8):Aristotle’s view of causation

Date & Time: Friday, 12 Dec., 2-4 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

Aristotle provides a compelling account of the metaphysics of powers but focuses little on how they act in combination[1]. Contemporary science, by contrast, is centrally concerned with nomological machines (often termed mechanisms): arrangements of features and powers whose repeat operation can rise to laws of nature. Nomological machines typically involve the simultaneous exercising of multiple powers, which we may take to be Aristotelian[2], so that the question of how such powers combine is central to modern science – but is unfortunately far from adequately answered.

The exercisings of some powers seem to be contributions to immediate changing, e.g. powers which result in forces, and perhaps (but perhaps not) the powers to heat / cool, to dissolve, or to chemically react. The exercisings of other powers are processes which take time, e.g. the power of a pendulum to swing, a cistern to produce a flush, a neuron to fire, or a glass to smash. I explore a range of examples featuring combinations of powers with each of these two sorts of timing: this suggests a diversity of case types of how powers combine (which should perhaps not surprise an adherent of the Stanford School). However, it seems that (often at least) the exercise of a power that occurs over time relies on structures within the machine to coordinate the relevant powers of the parts. For such time extended powers, it seems that we might reframe the question of how the exercising of powers combine, as a question concerning how the structures which license those powers combine in forming the machine arrangement. I explain how this approach might lead to a more unified account of how Aristotelian powers combine.


[1] In combinations other than correlate agent-patient powers, that is. For a good account of Aristotle’s metaphysics of powers see Anna Marmodoro’s The union of cause and effect in Aristotle (2007).
[2] Cartwright & Pemberton (2012), Aristotelian powers: without them, what would modern science do?


About the speaker

John Pemberton, Associate at the Centre for Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences at LSE

專長:
Change, powers, causation, arrangement, structure, laws

FALL 2014 Lectures Series (No.7):Physical vs. mathematical structures: is there a difference?

Date & Time: Wed, 10 Dec., 2-4 p.m.
Venue: Rm 242, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU


About the speaker

Alexandre Guay, 比利時 魯汶大學副教授,物理學哲學家

專長:
Philosophy of Physics, Ontology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Biology, History of Science, Philosophy of Science, Evolutionary Biology, Aristotle, Behavioral Ecology

Thursday, December 04, 2014

FALL 2014 Lectures Series (No.6):從西田哲學來看現象學的「超越」問題

Date & Time: Friday, 5 Dec., 2-4 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

  本文的目標有二:首先是釐清胡塞爾與海德格對「超越」的理解並鋪陳其連續性,其次則是指出西田幾多郎對現象學的貢獻。在行文上區分為四個節次,首先(壹)筆者沿著兩重世界的區分來鋪陳超越問題,現象學對超越問題的解決線索在「意向性」。隨之(貳)我們透過胡塞爾1907年的《現象學觀念》來討論現象學對「內在」與「超越」的重新理解,並透過胡塞爾的「內在視域」與「外在視域」來闡釋包含在我們的體驗中的超越經驗。接著(參)我們討論海德格對胡塞爾的意向性的改造,如所周知,海德格將超越問題的討論引向此在的世界體驗,意向性在這裏成為此在的存在問題。筆者在這裏進一步闡釋世界的超越的意義,並且主張作為超越之最終指向的世界是「本真的世界」。最後(肆)我們從西田的立場來反省胡塞爾與海德格的現象學,筆者將批判的重點置西田的「否定的自覺」與現象學的「唯我論」問題。

About the speaker

黃文宏,德國弗萊堡大學 哲學博士,清華大學 哲學研究所所長

專長:
現象學、詮釋學、京都學派哲學

Monday, December 01, 2014

自我、知覺與意識國際工作坊VI

國立陽明大學心智哲學研究所CRG意識研究群



時間:  2014/12/26 (五)   10:30-17:10

地點:  陽明大學 活動中心第二會議室

會議議程: http://goo.gl/UTKNV9(議程有更動,請以此份為準)

報名網站:   http://goo.gl/MIIupO


主題演講者

洪裕宏 Allen  Houng (陽明大學心智哲學研究所)



邀請講者

張立鴻Li-Hung Chang (國立陽明大學人文與社會教育中心)

嚴如玉Karen Yan (國立陽明大學心智哲學研究所)

Jonathon Hricko (中央研究院歐美研究所)

林映彤 Ying-Tung Lin  (德國古騰堡大學)

邱千蕙 Lynn Chiu (美國密蘇里大學哲學系)

簡芃 Emma Chien  (加拿大亞伯達大學哲學系)

Sunday, November 30, 2014

2015陽明心哲所招生囉!


※更多招生訊息請至Facebook粉絲專業→陽明大學心智哲學所-招生粉專

你是否也曾思考過:什麼是意識?什麼是自我?什麼是時空?
如果你也曾有這樣的疑惑,如果你也懷抱著尋求這些問題的熱忱,如果你也想體驗探索世界的樂趣,歡迎你加入陽明大學心智哲學研究所,讓我們一同展開這場無與倫比的知識探索之旅。

入學考試:

初試報名日期:2014年12月22-30日
初試筆試日期:2015年2月14日
初試筆試科目:英文、邏輯 
初試合格名單:2015年3月13日
複試口試日期:2015年3月19-22日
複試合格名單:2014年4月1日
(以上日期與資訊,應以陽明大學招生網頁所公布為準)

招生說明會:

時間:2014年12月19日週五,15:00-17:00
地點:台大心理系館北B教室
..........(10617 臺北市羅斯福路四段一號/No. 1, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Road, Taipei,公館捷運站三號出口)
網路報名表:http://goo.gl/forms/0UhvaHDU8v





Saturday, November 22, 2014

FALL 2014 Lectures Series (No.5): Cognitive architecture and extended cognition

Date & Time: Monday, 24 Nov., 3-5 p.m.
Venue: Meeting Room, Institute of Philosophy of mind and cognition, NYMU

About the theme

  自1998年Andy Clark与David Chalmers在《分析》发表论文《延展心智》以来,围绕延展认知和延展心智论题的争论一直是当今心智哲学与认知科学哲学最为火爆的焦点之一。论战双方在诸多问题争锋相对,寸土必争,但一直被忽略的一个重要事实是:人们迄今为止能够识别和认定的心智(例如人类的或某些动物的)都是基于大脑和神经系统的,即便是鼓吹延展认知和延展心智论题的主将Andy Clark也坦承:延展认知也离不开那个以大脑为基础的、持久存在的认知内核。由此可见,论战双方都需要一个关于大脑何以是已知的(所有)认知系统或心智的基础的理论说明。报告人将试图初步勾画出这样一个说明的轮廓,并讨论由此给延展认知和延展心智论题之争带来的重要影响和启示。

About the speaker

朱菁,加拿大滑鐵盧大學哲學博士,中山大學 哲學系 教授

專長:
心智哲學、行動哲學、科學哲學、認知科學、道德哲學基礎

Tuesday, November 04, 2014

FALL 2014 Lectures Series (No.4): 賽伯格的悲歌: 台灣電子業女工的職業災害

Date & Time: Friday, 7 Nov., 2-4 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

女性主義科學哲學家哈洛威(Donna Haraway)在〈賽伯格宣言〉中指出,加工出口區以科學為本的跨國公司,特別是電子業,偏好雇用來自第三世界國家的女人,這個系統性的圖像牽涉再生產、性特質、文化、消費與生產。在宣言中哈洛威反覆使用一個雙關字「積體電路中的女人」(women in the integrated circuit),中文版譯者張君玫在譯註中,特別說明:「一方面哈洛威確實觸及了全球電子產業中的女性處境,另一方面,『積體電路』的英文字面上是『整合的迴圈』,恰可說明女人在全球新秩序中的處境與願景」。美國藝術家Lynn Randolph,深受哈洛威在〈賽伯格宣言〉中有關「手指靈巧的亞洲電子業女工」的描述影響,找來一名在美國讀社會學的中國女子當模特兒,這幅頭披豹皮、手連電腦鍵盤的賽伯格(圖一),後來成為哈洛威《猿猴、賽伯格和女人》英文版的封面,也是賽伯格最生動、具體的影像。
不幸的是,這些為全球消費市場生產及製造電子產品的賽伯格,為東亞許多發展中國家帶來經濟奇蹟,卻也發生許多重大職災,引起社會爭議或是法律訴訟。「賽伯格的悲歌」描述及討論東亞的性別、勞動與健康,首先回顧電子產業與東亞的女工興起,再描述幾起亞洲電子業女工的職業病爭議,包括1970年代台灣的飛歌(與美之美)女工猝死, 1990年代的RCA勞工罹癌爭議與訴訟,以及2000年之後,韓國三星的女工白血病求償,以及新加坡、馬來西亞、中國的類似案例;最後綜合討論生物醫學研究中的性別、階級、種族不平等。


About the speaker

林宜平台灣大學 衛生政策及管理研究所博士陽明大學科技與社會研究所 副教授

專長:
性別與健康、環境與健康、風險管理與溝通、醫療人類學、流行病學

Monday, October 13, 2014

10/31演講異動

本所學會預定於10/31(五)下午邀請來自北京大學的陳波教授演講,但由於講者行程安排過於緊湊,本演講決定取消,請大家不要撲空囉!

Tuesday, September 30, 2014

FALL 2014 Lectures Series (No.3): Self-touching illusion and bodily self-consciousness

Date & Time: Friday, 3 Oct., 2-4 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

Recent studies on the rubber hand illusion (RHI) and full-body illusions have engendered two outstanding issues: the relationship between body-part and full-body ownership, and whether misrepresentation can occur in one’s sense of “experiential ownership” (the sense that I am the one who is having this experience). Recently my team and I conducted a series of experiments that combined the RHI and the “body swap illusion.” The subject wore a head mounted display (HMD) connected with a stereo camera set on the experimenter’s head. Sitting face to face, they used their right hand holding a paintbrush to brush each other’s left hand. The subject watched through the HMD either the experimenter’s hand from 1PP, and/or the subject’s own hand from 3PP in the opposite direction (180°), or the subject’s full body from 3PP (180°, with or without face). Here are our findings: (1) the synchronous full-body conditions generate a “self-touching illusion”: many participants felt that “I was brushing my own hand!”; (2) the difference between the sense of body-part ownership and the sense of full-body ownership is a matter of degree; (3) double body effect: it is possible for healthy participants to have illusory experiences of owning two bodies; and (4) exploring the Wittgenstein-style questions (“it was me who felt being brushed, not someone else”), our data present a strong case against the mainstream philosophical view called the immunity principle (IEM). The fact of experiential ownership can be misrepresented by the subject’s pre-reflective sense of experiential ownership. I will discuss the implications of these findings and conclude that not only the sense of body ownership but also the sense of experiential ownership allow and call for interdisciplinary studies.

About the speaker

梁益堉美國印第安納大學哲學博士,現任國立台灣大學 哲學系副教授

專長:
心智哲學、知識論、科學哲學、語言哲學、形上學、當代英美哲學專題

Tuesday, September 23, 2014

FALL 2014 Lectures Series (No.2): Mechanisms, Capacities, and Nomological Machines

Date & Time: Friday, 26 Sept., 3-5 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

Cartwright (2007) believes that her work shares much in common with Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver’s mechanistic philosophy. Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) propose a dualistic account of mechanisms and believe that it stands in opposition to both substantivalist and process-ontology accounts. They locate Cartwright within the camp of substantivalists. In this article, I demonstrate that this disagreement can be eliminated and the two accounts are complementary. By comparing Cartwright’s work with that of Machamer, Darden, and Craver, I show that the two accounts presuppose each other’s concepts, and, therefore, that they share a common theoretical structure. But these commonalities oblige them to meet a challenge standardly issued by those philosophers who insist that laws play a crucial role in causal explanations. I argue that this challenge can be overcome by integrating the two accounts. 

About the speaker

陳瑞麟,現為國立中正大學哲學系講座教授,專長為科學哲學、自然哲學、西方科學史及科技與社會研究。

Reading material

Chen, Ruey-lin 'Mechanisms capacities and nomological machines' (unpublished)

Sunday, September 21, 2014

奠基、理解、跨域對話- 哲學和人文價值的檢討與前瞻

時間:2014年9月27日(星期六)
地點:陽明大學人社院第二教學大樓 242教室


Thursday, September 11, 2014

FALL 2014 Lecture Series (No.1): Revising Logic

Date & Time: Monday, 22 Sept., 3:30-5:30 p.m.
Venue: Rm 201, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

Much ink has been spilled over the last few decades in disputes between advocates of “classical logic”—that is, the logic invented by Frege and Russell, and polished by Hilbert and others—and advocates of non-classical logics—such as intuitionist and paraconsistent logics. One move that is commonly made in such debates is that logic cannot be revised. When the move is made, it is typically by defenders of classical logic. Possession, for them, is ten tenths of the law. The point of this paper is not to enter into substantive debates about which logic is correct—though relevant methodological issues will transpire in due course. The point is to examine the question of whether logic can be revised. (And let me make it clear at the start that I am talking about deductive logic. I think that matters concerning non-deductive logic are much the same, but that is an issue for another occasion.) Three questions, then, will concern us:
1. Can logic be revised?
2. If so, can this be done rationally?
3. If so, how is this done?
(extracted from 'Revising logic' by G. Priest provided in the reading material below.)

Thursday, September 04, 2014

2014 秋季系列演講 FALL 2014 Lecture Series


時間:每週五 14:00-16:00
Time: Friday, 2-4 p.m.
地點:陽明人社通識教育中心202室
Venue: Rm202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU
預定主題與講者:
Schedule:
  • 9/22  Prof. G. Priest 'Revising Logic' *Monday, 15:30-17:30*
  • 9/26  陳瑞麟 ‘Experimental discovery, data models, and mechanisms in Biology: an example from Mendel’s work’ *15:00-17:00*
  • 10/3  梁益堉 ‘Experiential ownership and pre-reflective immunity’
  • 10/31 陳波「反駁Kripke反描述論的語意論證」 *15:00-17:00*
  • 11/7  林宜平 「臺伯格的悲歌:台灣電子業女工的職業災害
  • 11/24  朱菁 ‘Cognitive architecture and extended cognition (provisional)’ *Monday, 15:00-17:00*
  • 12/5  黃文宏 「從西田哲學來看現象學的『超越』問題
  • 12/10  Prof. A. Guay 'Physical vs. mathematical structures: is there a difference?' *Wednesday, 14:00-16:00*
  • 12/12  Prof. J. Pemberton ‘Aristotle’s view of causation’
  • 12/19  林伶美 「鋼琴音樂與鋼琴工藝
  • 1/9  陳今偉 「評心智歸屬論」

報名 SIGN-UP

Wednesday, June 04, 2014

SPR 2014 Lecture Series (No.8): The semantics of scientific discourse involving hypothetical entities


Date & Time: Friday, 6 Jun., 2-4 p.m. 
Venue: Rm202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU  

About the theme

     In the scientific realism debate, there has been a recent turn away from wholesale arguments that purport to tell us about the approximate truth of theories in general, and toward retail arguments that purport to tell us about the approximate truth of particular theories. While this shift has brought with it a renewed interest in case studies that has arguably enriched the debate, retail arguments alone fail to have any general implications for the debate. I aim to develop a position that captures what is satisfying about the turn to retail arguments, and yet has some more general implications. My starting point is that many of the case studies that have drawn the most attention involve hypothetical entities. I draw on some work in linguistics on discourse referents in order to defend a general view of the semantics of scientific discourse that involves hypothetical entities. I argue that when scientists introduce terms to name hypothetical entities, those terms have discourse referents, but lack empirical referents; reference to empirical entities is possible only once there is some consensus in the scientific community that an empirical entity has been discovered.

Tuesday, May 20, 2014

SPR 2014 Lecture Series (No.7):Neural mechanisms for updating and choice computations in value-base decisions


Date & Time: Friday, 23 May, 2-4 p.m. 
Venue: Rm202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU  

About the theme

Decision neuroscience, or neuroeconomics, is a young and interdisciplinary field that aims to understand how the brain makes decisions. It started roughly about 15 years ago and has attracted neurobiologists, psychologists, and economists over the years. In this talk, I will give an overview for research on decision neuroscience. I will specifically focus on perceptual decision making and value-based decision making, two kinds of decisions that have received great attention in the past decade. I will talk about how neuroscientists think about these different kinds of decision problems, how we design experiments to study them, how to model them mathematically, and finally, the neural architecture that might produce many of the decisions we make in daily life. 

2014 陽明心哲所捷報


恭喜:
秦慧敏 同學 獲得 University of Alberta, Canada 哲學系博士學程入學許可與獎學金
鄭婕凌 同學 獲得 Georgia State University, USA 哲學系碩士學程入學許可與獎學金
林庭安 研究助理 獲得 Texas Tech University, USA 哲學系碩士學程入學許可、全額及校級獎學金

Monday, May 12, 2014

2014春季系列演講(No.6):攝影與革命- Tina Modotti 於1920年代墨西哥的「社會生產」

關於主題

這場演講以蒂娜.摩多提(Tina Modotti, 1896-1942)的革命攝影為主題,探討這位左派女性攝影家移居墨西哥時期(1923-1930)的攝影實踐。我將以從摩多提1929 年的生前唯一個展出發,特別是以她在觀展小冊最前面,以紅字引用托勒斯基(Leon Trotsky)的見解為線索,從托勒斯基的論著《文學與革命》(1924)中汲取養分,將摩多提的攝影置於墨西哥後革命時期的文藝與社會脈絡中詮釋,以開拓迄今中外文研究文獻中少見的馬克思主義詮釋。我的論述將從視覺分析出發,援引托勒斯基的唯物辯證法觀點,從生產與消費的情境,來探討她的相機如何成為服務革命大眾與重構社會真實的武器。

關於講者

劉瑞琪 教授,現為國立陽明大學視覺文化研究所所長及教授。專長為攝影研究、性別與視覺文化、歐美當代與現代視覺藝術、藝術理論、現代與當代醫療視覺文化。

Tuesday, April 29, 2014

SPR 2014 Lectures Series (No.5): Conditionals and Deliberations

About the theme

Backtracking conditionals are conditionals at least partially evaluated on the basis of preconditions or backtracking grounds of their antecedents. Inasmuch as backtracking conditionals seem to be excluded by causal and practical deliberation, it is fairly controversial that backtracking conditionals are distinct from non- backtracking conditionals. We propose a subversive thesis: all conditionals, whether counterfactual or indicative, are backtracking conditionals. On the basis of this thesis, the failure of the various attempts to establish the distinction between backtracking and non-backtracking conditionals is explained. The distinction is better characterized using a fine-grained distinction between two modes of backtracking. These modes of backtracking are further employed to resolve some puzzles about the relations between conditionals and deliberations.

About the speaker

Prof. Wang, Linton I-Chi, is an associate professor of philosophy at National Chung-Cheng University whose research is mainly in Logic, and in Philosophy of Language.

Thursday, April 10, 2014

SPR 2014 Lecture Series (No.4): On scientific essentialism


About the theme

Scientific essentialism is the view, advocated and defended by Brian Ellis, Alexander Bird, and many others, which claims that laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. On this view, there is no genuine metaphysical possibility that a law of nature could fail. In this talk, I shall examine two main arguments for this necessitarian view: (i) the argument from dispositions and (ii) the argument from anti-quidditism. I shall show that neither of these arguments is successful. This leaves the traditional view (i.e., the view that laws are physical or nomic necessities weaker than metaphysical necessities) a more plausible option. 

Tuesday, March 18, 2014

SPR 2014 Lecture Series (No.3): Epistemic grace- a virtue epistemological account


About the theme

     In this paper the speaker argues for a new virtue epistemic account of the nature of knowledge. The account is motivated by the challenges that cases of testimonial knowledge and Barney-type cases (Barn Façade-type cases) present for existing virtue epistemic accounts of knowledge. This attempt was initially based on a non-standard reading of Gettier cases according to which it’s bad epistemic luck that is knowledge undermining. Building on this reading, the speaker argues that thinking of knowledge as requiring what he'd call epistemic grace both yields the right results in standard Gettier-type cases and Barney-type cases, and does so in a well motivated way. (adapted from the article provided below in reading material)

Tuesday, March 11, 2014

SPR 2014 Lectures Series (No.2): Is Biology an autonomous science?


About the speaker

Prof. Chou, Chen-Kung, is a professor of Biomedical Science at Chang-Gung University who specialises in signal transduction in Cellular Physiology and Tumor Biology. 

Reading material

1. Mayr, Ernst "The autonomy of biology: the position of biology among sciences" Quarterly Review of Biology 71 (1996), 97-106

Friday, March 07, 2014

[Workshop] 語言、心靈與行動 Language, Mind and Action

Date: Tue., Mar.11, 2014 09:00-18:30
Venue: Rm 225, New Medical Building, NYMU

2014春季系列演講 SPR 2014 Lecture Series

Thursday, February 27, 2014

2014春季系列演講(No.1):親近台灣文學

關於講者

李瑞騰 教授,現為國立中央大學中國文學系教授,兼任台灣詩學季刊社長、九歌文教基金會執行長及文訊雜誌總編輯、編輯總監及顧問,曾任國立台灣文學館館長。研究專長為中國古典詩、晚清文學、台灣現代文學、東南亞華語文學與出版學。

Friday, February 21, 2014

陽明大學科技與社會研究所演講

主辦單位:台灣聯合大學系統科技與社會推動計畫、陽明大學科技與社會研究所

時間:2014年2月26日週三,1230-1430
地點:陽明大學第二教學大樓242音樂教室
主持人:王文基 副教授 (陽明大學科技與社會研究所)

主題:Process, Consciousness, and Self
講者:嚴如玉 助理教授 (陽明大學心智哲學研究所)

主題:Phlogiston as a Referring Term
講者:Dr. Hricko, Jonathon