Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU
About the theme
Cartwright (2007) believes that her work shares much in common with Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver’s mechanistic philosophy. Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) propose a dualistic account of mechanisms and believe that it stands in opposition to both substantivalist and process-ontology accounts. They locate Cartwright within the camp of substantivalists. In this article, I demonstrate that this disagreement can be eliminated and the two accounts are complementary. By comparing Cartwright’s work with that of Machamer, Darden, and Craver, I show that the two accounts presuppose each other’s concepts, and, therefore, that they share a common theoretical structure. But these commonalities oblige them to meet a challenge standardly issued by those philosophers who insist that laws play a crucial role in causal explanations. I argue that this challenge can be overcome by integrating the two accounts.