Tuesday, September 30, 2014

FALL 2014 Lectures Series (No.3): Self-touching illusion and bodily self-consciousness

Date & Time: Friday, 3 Oct., 2-4 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

Recent studies on the rubber hand illusion (RHI) and full-body illusions have engendered two outstanding issues: the relationship between body-part and full-body ownership, and whether misrepresentation can occur in one’s sense of “experiential ownership” (the sense that I am the one who is having this experience). Recently my team and I conducted a series of experiments that combined the RHI and the “body swap illusion.” The subject wore a head mounted display (HMD) connected with a stereo camera set on the experimenter’s head. Sitting face to face, they used their right hand holding a paintbrush to brush each other’s left hand. The subject watched through the HMD either the experimenter’s hand from 1PP, and/or the subject’s own hand from 3PP in the opposite direction (180°), or the subject’s full body from 3PP (180°, with or without face). Here are our findings: (1) the synchronous full-body conditions generate a “self-touching illusion”: many participants felt that “I was brushing my own hand!”; (2) the difference between the sense of body-part ownership and the sense of full-body ownership is a matter of degree; (3) double body effect: it is possible for healthy participants to have illusory experiences of owning two bodies; and (4) exploring the Wittgenstein-style questions (“it was me who felt being brushed, not someone else”), our data present a strong case against the mainstream philosophical view called the immunity principle (IEM). The fact of experiential ownership can be misrepresented by the subject’s pre-reflective sense of experiential ownership. I will discuss the implications of these findings and conclude that not only the sense of body ownership but also the sense of experiential ownership allow and call for interdisciplinary studies.

About the speaker

梁益堉美國印第安納大學哲學博士,現任國立台灣大學 哲學系副教授


Tuesday, September 23, 2014

FALL 2014 Lectures Series (No.2): Mechanisms, Capacities, and Nomological Machines

Date & Time: Friday, 26 Sept., 3-5 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

Cartwright (2007) believes that her work shares much in common with Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver’s mechanistic philosophy. Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) propose a dualistic account of mechanisms and believe that it stands in opposition to both substantivalist and process-ontology accounts. They locate Cartwright within the camp of substantivalists. In this article, I demonstrate that this disagreement can be eliminated and the two accounts are complementary. By comparing Cartwright’s work with that of Machamer, Darden, and Craver, I show that the two accounts presuppose each other’s concepts, and, therefore, that they share a common theoretical structure. But these commonalities oblige them to meet a challenge standardly issued by those philosophers who insist that laws play a crucial role in causal explanations. I argue that this challenge can be overcome by integrating the two accounts. 

About the speaker


Reading material

Chen, Ruey-lin 'Mechanisms capacities and nomological machines' (unpublished)

Sunday, September 21, 2014

奠基、理解、跨域對話- 哲學和人文價值的檢討與前瞻

地點:陽明大學人社院第二教學大樓 242教室

Thursday, September 11, 2014

FALL 2014 Lecture Series (No.1): Revising Logic

Date & Time: Monday, 22 Sept., 3:30-5:30 p.m.
Venue: Rm 201, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

Much ink has been spilled over the last few decades in disputes between advocates of “classical logic”—that is, the logic invented by Frege and Russell, and polished by Hilbert and others—and advocates of non-classical logics—such as intuitionist and paraconsistent logics. One move that is commonly made in such debates is that logic cannot be revised. When the move is made, it is typically by defenders of classical logic. Possession, for them, is ten tenths of the law. The point of this paper is not to enter into substantive debates about which logic is correct—though relevant methodological issues will transpire in due course. The point is to examine the question of whether logic can be revised. (And let me make it clear at the start that I am talking about deductive logic. I think that matters concerning non-deductive logic are much the same, but that is an issue for another occasion.) Three questions, then, will concern us:
1. Can logic be revised?
2. If so, can this be done rationally?
3. If so, how is this done?
(extracted from 'Revising logic' by G. Priest provided in the reading material below.)

Thursday, September 04, 2014

2014 秋季系列演講 FALL 2014 Lecture Series

時間:每週五 14:00-16:00
Time: Friday, 2-4 p.m.
Venue: Rm202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU
  • 9/22  Prof. G. Priest 'Revising Logic' *Monday, 15:30-17:30*
  • 9/26  陳瑞麟 ‘Experimental discovery, data models, and mechanisms in Biology: an example from Mendel’s work’ *15:00-17:00*
  • 10/3  梁益堉 ‘Experiential ownership and pre-reflective immunity’
  • 10/31 陳波「反駁Kripke反描述論的語意論證」 *15:00-17:00*
  • 11/7  林宜平 「臺伯格的悲歌:台灣電子業女工的職業災害
  • 11/24  朱菁 ‘Cognitive architecture and extended cognition (provisional)’ *Monday, 15:00-17:00*
  • 12/5  黃文宏 「從西田哲學來看現象學的『超越』問題
  • 12/10  Prof. A. Guay 'Physical vs. mathematical structures: is there a difference?' *Wednesday, 14:00-16:00*
  • 12/12  Prof. J. Pemberton ‘Aristotle’s view of causation’
  • 12/19  林伶美 「鋼琴音樂與鋼琴工藝
  • 1/9  陳今偉 「評心智歸屬論」