Date & Time: Friday, 25 Sep., 2:30-3:30 p.m.
Venue: Rm 211, Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Yang Ming
About the themeAccording to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. Truth is One because there is a single truth property—truth-as-such—that applies across all truth-apt domains of discourse. Truth is Many because this truth property may be grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium-sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. In recent work Michael Lynch has suggested that a commitment to moderate truth pluralism supports logical pluralism, understood as the thesis that there are several equally legitimate notions of validity. The path from truth to logical pluralism is meant to go through Generalized Tarski’s Thesis (in the terminology of Beall and Restall (2006)): an argument is valid-X if and only if, in every case-X in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true. Since different properties ground truth in different domains and go with different types of case, different domains go with different kinds of validity. In this paper I critically examine Lynch’s argument. I suggest that Lynch fails to distinguish between rules of reasoning for truth-as-such and rules of reasoning for properties that ground truth-as-such. Taking on board this distinction I argue that there is no path from moderate alethic pluralism to logical pluralism via Generalized Tarski’s Thesis. I then go on to investigate whether there is any sense in which moderate truth pluralists can be pluralists about logic.
About the speaker
Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee LindingAssociate Professor of Philosophy, Yonsei University
專長：epistemology, truth, metaphysics, and philosophy of logic and mathematics