Thursday, September 24, 2015

臨時演講通知: If truth is One, logic is One: on moderate pluralism about truth and logic

Date & Time: Friday, 25 Sep., 2:30-3:30 p.m.
Venue: Rm 211, Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Yang Ming

About the theme

  According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. Truth is One because there is a single truth property—truth-as-such—that applies across all truth-apt domains of discourse. Truth is Many because this truth property may be grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium-sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. In recent work Michael Lynch has suggested that a commitment to moderate truth pluralism supports logical pluralism, understood as the thesis that there are several equally legitimate notions of validity. The path from truth to logical pluralism is meant to go through Generalized Tarski’s Thesis (in the terminology of Beall and Restall (2006)): an argument is valid-X if and only if, in every case-X in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true. Since different properties ground truth in different domains and go with different types of case, different domains go with different kinds of validity. In this paper I critically examine Lynch’s argument. I suggest that Lynch fails to distinguish between rules of reasoning for truth-as-such and rules of reasoning for properties that ground truth-as-such. Taking on board this distinction I argue that there is no path from moderate alethic pluralism to logical pluralism via Generalized Tarski’s Thesis. I then go on to investigate whether there is any sense in which moderate truth pluralists can be pluralists about logic.

About the speaker

Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Yonsei University

epistemology, truth, metaphysics, and philosophy of logic and mathematics

Wednesday, September 23, 2015

AUTUMN 2015 Lectures Series (No.1): Early Detection of Dementia: a Neuropsychological Perspective 從臨床神經心理學的角度來研究失智症早期偵測

Date & Time: Friday, 25 Sep., 3:30-4:30 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

  Efficient and accurate prediction of dementia such as Alzheimer’s disease in the preclinical stage is important for individual, family, social and medical reasons. In this talk, I will discuss some of the issues related to neuropsychological measurement as a key to the valid and reliable identification of persons who are at risk of developing dementia. I will also illustrate that when such efforts to more comprehensively assess neuropsychological functions are undertaken, better characterizations of spared and impaired cognitive and functional abilities result, and lead to more convincing associations with other biomarkers as well as to clinical outcomes.

About the speaker


Clinical Neuropsychology/Higher cortical functioning/Use of neuroimaging(structural and functional) & behavioral paradigms to investigate individuals at high risk for Alzheimer's disease (AD) (i.e., those with Mild Cognitive Impairment and those at increased genetic risk for AD)/Cognitive function and factors related to prediction of surgical outcomes in seizure disorders/Traumatic brain injury/Brain plasticity

Tuesday, September 22, 2015

2015 秋季系列演講 AUTUMN 2015 Lecture Series

9/25(Fri) 台大心理系助理教授 張玉玲:Early Detection of Dementia: a Neuropsychological Perspective

10/23(Fri) 陽明大學心智哲學研究所教授 洪裕宏:意識經驗為何無解?

10/26(Mon) 阿姆斯特丹大學大學教授 Johan van Benthem:Logic in Play

11/13(Fri) 南開大學哲學院教授 張曉芒:大陸高校思維素質教育的現狀

11/27(Fri) 台大心理系助理教授 黃從仁:待訂

12/4(Fri) 台大哲學系副教授王榮麟:On the Darwinian argument against moral realism

12/18(Fri) 陽明大學心智哲學研究所所長 王文方:In Defense of Dretske against Holliday's Formalization

1/8(Fri) 馬偕全教中心副教授 蔡承志:Some metaphysical concerns about the ethics of killing