When I taste a glass of wine, there is a sense in which the phenomenal character of the taste of the wine is for me, rather than for you. This for-me-ness can be construed as the relation between some phenomenal character and the subject of consciousness. Moreover, the “me” in for-me-ness refers to the subject of consciousness, whatever it turns out to be. Several philosophers argue that for-me-ness is constitutive of the phenomenological structure of consciousness, i.e., to explain the phenomenological structure of consciousness, one must at least appeal to for-me-ness.
Among those who defend the above position, one prominent group of philosophers defends Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness, including David Rosenthal and Peter Carruthers who employ different notions of HOT to explain for-me-ness. Arguably, both of them commit to the claim that for-me-ness realizes the interpretation function when it comes to constituting the phenomenological structure of consciousness in contrast to the speaker's proposal—Perspectival-Reflexive Representationalism.
*adapted from the abstract written by K.Yan, which you could find the original content provided in the reading material below.
About the speaker
Karen Yan, currently an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at National Yangming University (2013-), specializes in philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience. For more details, please visit her personal page: http://karenruyuyan.blogspot.tw/.