２０１５招生日程表

【聖誕快報！】

2015陽明大學心智哲學所的招生時間出爐啦～大家快來報名唷！

報名時間：2015年12月28日至2016年1月5日

筆試日期：2016年2月29日

初試合格公告：2016年3月18日

複試日期：2016年3月24日至3月27日間

複試合格公告：2016年4月12日

2015陽明心智哲學研究所招生說明會

（請大家記得先報名，方便我們統計人數哦！！報名網址：http://goo.gl/forms/Wtn0IIyE5E）

[2016年陽明心哲所招生說明會]

時間：2015年12月19日(週六) 15:00PM - 17:00PM
地點：台大心理系館北A教室(10617 臺北市羅斯福路四段一號／No. 1, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Road, Taipei，公館捷運站三號出口)

AUTUMN 2015 Lectures Series (No.7): 外在世界的懷疑論——替Dretske的理論作出形式化的辯護 (In Defense of Dretske against Holliday's Formalization)

Date & Time: Friday, 18 Dec., 3:30-5:30 p.m.

Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

為了要反駁懷疑論，Dretske建議我們反對懷疑論論證中的一個重要成分：認知封閉性原則。 Dretske同時認為，他的相關選項理論能夠證明認知運算元只是半穿透的運算元，而非全穿透的運算元。但Holliday採取了Heller的建議而對Dretske的相關選擇理論作出了形式化的工作。Holliday認為，他的形式化結果證明：Dretske的認知運算元其實不是半穿透的運算元。我在本次演講中將論證：Holliday的形式化工作並不忠於Dretske的相關選項理論。我將建議另一種新而忠實地形式化Dretske理論的方法，並證明：在我的形式化方法中，認知運算元的確如Dretske所認為的是個半穿透的運算元。我在這次報告中還將比較Dretske的理論與Heller為了解決懷疑論而提出的類似想法。

About the speaker

王文方 

陽明大學心智哲學所  所長

主要專長領域

邏輯、模態邏輯、邏輯哲學、形上學

AUTUMN 2015 Lectures Series (No.5): Computational cognitive neuroscience: From neurons to behavior

Date & Time: Friday, 27 Nov., 3:30-5:30 p.m.

Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

How does the brain control behavior? What do neural circuits compute? The field of cognitive neuroscience is thriving thanks to advances in neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, neuroimaging, and cognitive psychology. Given the rich set of empirical observations aggregated from these fields, an emerging challenge is to provide a unified theory that relates different levels of analysis, explaining how neural systems in the brain give rise to intelligent human behavior. Computational cognitive neuroscience addresses the above questions by studying neural representations and mechanisms from a theoretical perspective. It can offer new insights beyond brain-behavior correlations. One example is the application of machine learning/pattern recognition techniques to brain data for understanding neural representations and for developing brain-computer interfaces. Another example is the class of neural models that construct system-level architectures from the first principles, such as local computation and competitive normalization. These computational models can quantitatively simulate cognitive functions using plausible neural mechanisms and explain seemingly conflicting data in a coherent framework. In this presentation, differences among computational approaches in (cognitive) neuroscience will be contrasted. The past, present, and future of computational cognitive neuroscience will also be discussed.

About the speaker

Tsung-Ren Huang (黃從仁) 

Department of Psychology Neurobiology and Cognitive Science Center 

National Taiwan University

Workshop on Body Perception, Ownership, and Awareness(Updated)

Monday (Nov 30), National Yang-Ming University, Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Education Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, 201 & 202

International  MOST-DAAD Project “Self-Consciousness and Multisensory Integration: Philosophical and Neuroscientific Perspectives” – Workshop on Body Perception, Ownership, and Awareness

10:00-10:15 Welcome & Opening Remarks - Allen Houng (Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, NYMU)

10:15-11:00 Hong Yu Wong (Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, Philosophy of Neuroscience Group, University of Tübingen, Germany)

A Sense of Body Ownership

11:00-11:15 Discussion - Chair: Aleksandra Mroczko-Wasowicz  (Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, NYMU)

11:15-11:30 Break

11:30-12:15 Krisztina Orban (Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, Philosophy of Neuroscience Group, University of Tübingen, Germany)

Me or not me? The fundamental difference between the self and the other

12:15-12:30 Discussion - Chair: Caleb Liang (Department of Philosophy, NTU)

12:30-14:00 Round-table talks + lunch

ABSTRACTS:

Title: A Sense of Body Ownership

Hong Yu Wong

Abstract: Our bodies and our sense of embodiment are critical to our sense of ourselves as material beings (Cassam 1997, Longuenesse 2006). One prominent strand of research on embodiment concerns the sense of ownership that we have over our bodies. The key questions are how to understand this sense of ownership, and what its function is. I begin by characterising the sense of body ownership and its relation to basic forms of bodily awareness, such as proprioception (Martin 1995, de Vignemont 2007, Peacocke 2014). A major issue is the shape of a constitutive account and its status with respect to pathologies where it is compromised, such as somatoparaphrenia and alien limb syndrome (Vallar and Ronchi 2009, de Vignemont 2007 and 2011). A second question is the function of the sense of body ownership. I will focus on how the sense of body ownership affects agency and the sense of agency – in health and in pathologies such as anosognosia for hemiplegia (Berti et al. 2005, Baier and Karnath 2008, Tsakiris and Fotopoulou 2013). In this talk, I will sketch an account of body ownership that diverges from the three major accounts and discuss its significance for action and sense of agency.

Title: Me or not me? The fundamental difference between the self and the other

Krisztina Orbán

Abstract: I will argue that there are four features of the first person phenomenon which has to be accounted for in the fundamental understanding of ‘I’. The first will be the radical asymmetry between the first person perspective and third person perspective or other perspectives (2nd person). This idea has its roots in Perry’s notion of cognitive significance. The second will be privacy which can be found in Frege, Shoemaker, Evans and Recanati, but I will introduce a new version of this criterion. I will try to find what unifies any sensory experience, including experiences involving virtual reality. My notion of experience will be neutral on whether it is a perceptual experience, experience in a virtual reality set up, or another kind of experience. However, I will distinguish between internal (e.g. proprioception) and external (e.g. vision, audition, touch) experience. I will point out an asymmetry in internal and external experience in order to understand privacy. I will provide some reasons to believe that the reference fixing rule for ‘I’ cannot render any of these necessary features contingent. In light of this, I will criticize existing views on what fixes the referent of ‘I’. I will discuss the token reflexive rule for ‘I’, the fundamental reference rule for ‘I’, the demonstrative model for ‘I’ and subjectless views of ‘I’. I will show that none of them is able to account for all the necessary features of ‘I’.

臨時演講通知： If truth is One, logic is One: on moderate pluralism about truth and logic

Date & Time: Friday, 25 Sep., 2:30-3:30 p.m.

Venue: Rm 211, Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Yang Ming

About the theme

  According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. Truth is One because there is a single truth property—truth-as-such—that applies across all truth-apt domains of discourse. Truth is Many because this truth property may be grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium-sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. In recent work Michael Lynch has suggested that a commitment to moderate truth pluralism supports logical pluralism, understood as the thesis that there are several equally legitimate notions of validity. The path from truth to logical pluralism is meant to go through Generalized Tarski’s Thesis (in the terminology of Beall and Restall (2006)): an argument is valid-X if and only if, in every case-X in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true. Since different properties ground truth in different domains and go with different types of case, different domains go with different kinds of validity. In this paper I critically examine Lynch’s argument. I suggest that Lynch fails to distinguish between rules of reasoning for truth-as-such and rules of reasoning for properties that ground truth-as-such. Taking on board this distinction I argue that there is no path from moderate alethic pluralism to logical pluralism via Generalized Tarski’s Thesis. I then go on to investigate whether there is any sense in which moderate truth pluralists can be pluralists about logic.

About the speaker

Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Yonsei University

專長：

epistemology, truth, metaphysics, and philosophy of logic and mathematics

AUTUMN 2015 Lectures Series (No.1): Early Detection of Dementia: a Neuropsychological Perspective 從臨床神經心理學的角度來研究失智症早期偵測

Date & Time: Friday, 25 Sep., 3:30-4:30 p.m.

Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

  Efficient and accurate prediction of dementia such as Alzheimer’s disease in the preclinical stage is important for individual, family, social and medical reasons. In this talk, I will discuss some of the issues related to neuropsychological measurement as a key to the valid and reliable identification of persons who are at risk of developing dementia. I will also illustrate that when such efforts to more comprehensively assess neuropsychological functions are undertaken, better characterizations of spared and impaired cognitive and functional abilities result, and lead to more convincing associations with other biomarkers as well as to clinical outcomes.

About the speaker

張玉玲

台大心理系助理教授

專長：

Clinical Neuropsychology／Higher cortical functioning／Use of neuroimaging(structural and functional) & behavioral paradigms to investigate individuals at high risk for Alzheimer's disease (AD) (i.e., those with Mild Cognitive Impairment and those at increased genetic risk for AD)／Cognitive function and factors related to prediction of surgical outcomes in seizure disorders／Traumatic brain injury／Brain plasticity

2015 秋季系列演講 AUTUMN 2015 Lecture Series

9/25(Fri) 台大心理系助理教授 張玉玲：Early Detection of Dementia: a Neuropsychological Perspective

從臨床神經心理學的角度來研究失智症早期偵測

10/23(Fri) 陽明大學心智哲學研究所教授 洪裕宏：意識經驗為何無解？

10/26(Mon) 阿姆斯特丹大學大學教授 Johan van Benthem:Logic in Play

(含演講前的座談會)

11/13(Fri) 南開大學哲學院教授 張曉芒：大陸高校思維素質教育的現狀

11/27(Fri) 台大心理系助理教授 黃從仁：待訂

12/4(Fri) 台大哲學系副教授王榮麟:On the Darwinian argument against moral realism

演化論者的反道德實在論論證

12/18(Fri) 陽明大學心智哲學研究所所長 王文方：In Defense of Dretske against Holliday's Formalization

1/8(Fri) 馬偕全教中心副教授 蔡承志：Some metaphysical concerns about the ethics of killing

殺人倫理學的形上學困境

Special Lecture: Johan van Benthem

Speaker： Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam)
Date：2015/10/26(一)

About the speaker:

Johan van Benthem為阿姆斯特丹大學的大學教授（University professor）、斯坦福大學Henry Waldgrave Stuart教授、荷蘭皇家科學院院士、歐洲科學院院士、 國際哲學學院院士。 1996年獲荷蘭國家級斯賓諾莎獎，這是自然科學和社會科學領域的最高獎項。在上世紀90年代，他創建了阿姆斯特丹大學的邏輯、語言與計算研究所（ILLC），並長期指導該研究所的工作。 ILLC是當今國際頂尖、規模最大、專門從事邏輯與語言學、計算機科學、認知科學等交叉領域研究的邏輯學研究中心。到目前為止，他撰寫了9部專著和約450篇論文，主編了4部具有權威性的邏輯手冊，他的著作已被翻譯成俄語、西班牙語、漢語等出版，在世界範圍內影響廣泛。他培養了70名博士研究生、50名碩士研究生，其中有40名博士畢業生已在世界上各國的大學成功獲得了永久職位。此外，他還在很多國際組織兼職，任多個重要英文雜誌的主編或編委。


詳細資訊將在近期公布，歡迎大家踴躍參加！

輔仁陽明哲學諮商與精神醫學哲學工作坊

日期：2015年6月9日(二)

地點：輔仁大學文華樓LI310

主辦單位：輔仁大學哲學系、陽明大學心智哲學研究所

點此下載議程

SPRING 2015 Lectures Series (No.6): 人同此心，心同此理？以莊子與荀子的心智觀為例

Date & Time: Friday, 22 May., 3:30-4:30 p.m.

Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

　　眾所周知，「人同此心，心同此理」這一句話標誌著中國儒學（尤其是宋明心學）的思想高峰，而它如此明快，如此簡約而扼要地將「心」與「理」這兩個概念予以綰給，予以密合，而將其放入具有強烈「同一性」意涵的命題之中，其實已然可以窺知中國古代心智觀某些面向的意理信息。

　　而若吾人將「心同理同」此一命題上推於哲學理想的高層，並使其發顯其中難以實證實驗的意義效力，則吾人恐將可能落入中國傳統心智觀某些既定或特定的意識框架之間。由此看來，努力回返心智活動之真實歷程，而後持續地細細琢磨「心」與「理」二概念，以及其間之意理聯結，則吾人便可能有機會回到古中國心智觀內在而真實的脈絡。因此，本篇擇定先秦儒家與先秦道家兩個代表人物──荀子與莊子對心智活動所提出的哲學觀點，進而在認識主體（心）與認識範疇（理）之間，進行具認識論意趣的概念解析與系統重構。如此一來，吾人也便可以進一步對漢唐以迄宋明，一逕推擴開來的某些哲學命題，所以一直在形上學、宇宙觀、認識論與倫理實踐之學之間來回推移的緣由有所認知，有所理解，有所洞察。

About the speaker

葉海煙

成功大學中文系系主任

專長：

道家哲學研究、當代新儒學研究、中國哲學史研究

SPRING 2015 Lectures Series (No.5): The Objectivity of Content from the Neuroscientific Point of View

Date & Time: Friday, 17 Apr., 3:30-4:30 p.m.

Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

The issue concerning the objectivity of content is central to philosophy. Burge (2010) has recently tried to ground the objectivity of content on an anti-individualistic conception of perceptual content. In this talk, I shall raise some worries and inadequacies about his psychology-based approach, and propose some ways to strengthen it with a focus on the neuroscientific study of consciousness and intentionality such as one undertaken by Northoff (2014a, b).

About the speaker

Kai-Yuan Cheng 鄭凱元

Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang-Ming University

專長：

語言哲學、形上學、維根斯坦哲學

SPRING 2015 Lectures Series (No.4): Memory Enhancement: A phenomenological

Date & Time: Friday, 10 Apr., 3:30-5:30 p.m.

Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

The growing understanding of human mind and cognition and the development of neurotechnology have triggered the debate of cognitive enhancement in neuroethics. The talk aims to examine the normative issues of memory enhancement, and focuses on the issue of the distinction of memory treatment and enhancement. I argue that memory enhancement is distinguished from memory treatment by the demarcation of the existence of memory-related suffering. That is, memory enhancements are, under standard circumstances and without any unwilling suffering or potential suffering resulting from the alteration of memory functions, interventions that aim to manipulate memory functions based on the self-interests of the individual.

About the speaker

林映彤，德國古騰堡大學哲學博士

專長：

Philosophy of Mind; Neuroethics; Consciousness Studies; Philosophy of Cognitive Science; Memory; Cognitive Enhancement; Self-Consciousness; Delusion; Personal Identity

國立陽明大學心智哲學研究所一零四學年度(2015)碩士班招生考試 錄取名單

正取 6 名
320013　劉士豪　　320019　陳    聆　　320005　吳心萍　　320017　翁晉翼　　 320014　蔡坦岩　　320003　顏紹先

備取 4 名

320009　蔣德萱　　320016　郭心屏　　320002　朱喬茵　　320007　施伯靜

2015 春季系列演講 SPRING 2015 Lecture Series

國立陽明大學心智哲學研究所 一零四學年度(2015)碩士班招生考試 初試合格名單及複試注意事項

 心智哲學研究所 一零四學年度(2015)碩士班招生考試 初試合格名單及複試注意事項。

 
複試地點：心智哲學所會議室 
複試日期：2015/03/22(日)　　 
報到地點：人社院中庭 (第二教學大樓2F 校園地圖 http://www.ym.edu.tw/map.html Y6 )

各梯次報到時間
第一梯次：09:45~10:00 
320001　江聖照　　 320002　朱喬茵　　 320003　顏紹先　　 320004　陳宇貞
第二梯次：11:00~11:15 
320005　吳心萍　　 320006　陳慧如　　 320007　施伯靜　　 320009　蔣德萱
第三梯次：12:45~13:00 
320010　李宜潔　　 320012　忻之庭　　 320013　劉士豪　　 320014　蔡坦岩
第四梯次：14:15~14:30 
320016　郭心屏　　 320017　翁晉翼　　 320019　陳聆    　　 320022　張顥瀚

注意事項
1.符合複試資格考生請自行上網列印複試通知，並依規定準時報到應試。 
2.請依照簡章規定，於複試舉行前二日(3/19)，將「口試資料表」電子檔寄至 phil@ym.edu.tw ，遲交將酌予扣分。
3.報到時，請務必攜帶複試通知函及身分證件，逾該階段報到時間30分鐘以上者，視同放棄複試資格，不得報到及應試。
4.複試當天適逢假日本校校車停駛，請各考生自行安排交通工具前往試場。

碩士畢業論文口試訊息

學生姓名：龎皓
時間：2015年1月30日（星期五）中午12:00
地點：本所會議室(第二教學大樓2樓人社211)
論文題目：「什麼是客觀感知世界的條件?」

陽明輔大聯合哲學工作坊

【陽明輔大聯合哲學工作坊】

時間：2015/01/16 (五) 09:30-16:30地點：陽明大學第二教學大樓242教室

Dr. Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda will come to our institute and give a talk.

Theme:"Simplicity
Matters?
 The
Case 
of 
Non-­parametric
Models"

Date & Time: Thursday, 7 Jan., 1:30-3:30 p.m.

Venue: Meeting Room, Institute of Philosophy of mind and cognition, NYMU

About the theme

In this presentation, I claim that influential arguments concerning the importance of parametric simplicity for model selection have been biased by their focus on parametric models. See (Foster & Sober 1994) (Foster 2001) (Sober & Hitchcock 2004). Such a focus leads us to believe that there is a fundamental trade‐off between parametric simplicity and goodness of fit. But no such trade‐off is considered when we select non‐parametric models, like KNN1 regression models. We can increase the fit of KNN models by keeping the number of adjustable parameters to 1.

This leads me to point out that the important trade‐off that is made as we select any kind of model is between the bias and the variance of an estimator for a dependent variable. Consequently, I explain why a favored selection criterion for the proponents of parametric simplicity, i.e., the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) is not optimal (in any scenario) in order to tell if we have made a reasonable bias/variance trade‐off. A selection criterion based on crossvalidation is more appropriate.

Key References

Forster, M. (2001), “The New Science of Simplicity”, (In A. Zellner, H.

Keuzenkamp, and M. McAleer (Eds.), Simplicity, Inference and Modelling. (pp. 83‐

119). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Forster M. and Sober, E. (1994), “How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or

Less Ad Hoc Theories will Provide More Accurate Predictions”, The British

Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45: 1 ‐ 35.

Hitchcock, C. and Sober, E. (2004) “Prediction Versus Accommodation and the

Risk of Overfitting”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55: 1‐34

1 KNN

About the speaker

Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda, Laval University, Québec, Canada

AREAS OF SPECIALISATION

Philosophy of Science

Epistemology

Philosophy of Statistics and Probability

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Philosophy of Mind

Philosophy of Language

Philosophical Logic

Metaphysics

Applied Ethics

Big Data Studies