Wednesday, December 10, 2014

FALL 2014 Lectures Series (No.8):Aristotle’s view of causation

Date & Time: Friday, 12 Dec., 2-4 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

Aristotle provides a compelling account of the metaphysics of powers but focuses little on how they act in combination[1]. Contemporary science, by contrast, is centrally concerned with nomological machines (often termed mechanisms): arrangements of features and powers whose repeat operation can rise to laws of nature. Nomological machines typically involve the simultaneous exercising of multiple powers, which we may take to be Aristotelian[2], so that the question of how such powers combine is central to modern science – but is unfortunately far from adequately answered.

The exercisings of some powers seem to be contributions to immediate changing, e.g. powers which result in forces, and perhaps (but perhaps not) the powers to heat / cool, to dissolve, or to chemically react. The exercisings of other powers are processes which take time, e.g. the power of a pendulum to swing, a cistern to produce a flush, a neuron to fire, or a glass to smash. I explore a range of examples featuring combinations of powers with each of these two sorts of timing: this suggests a diversity of case types of how powers combine (which should perhaps not surprise an adherent of the Stanford School). However, it seems that (often at least) the exercise of a power that occurs over time relies on structures within the machine to coordinate the relevant powers of the parts. For such time extended powers, it seems that we might reframe the question of how the exercising of powers combine, as a question concerning how the structures which license those powers combine in forming the machine arrangement. I explain how this approach might lead to a more unified account of how Aristotelian powers combine.


[1] In combinations other than correlate agent-patient powers, that is. For a good account of Aristotle’s metaphysics of powers see Anna Marmodoro’s The union of cause and effect in Aristotle (2007).
[2] Cartwright & Pemberton (2012), Aristotelian powers: without them, what would modern science do?


About the speaker

John Pemberton, Associate at the Centre for Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences at LSE

專長:
Change, powers, causation, arrangement, structure, laws

FALL 2014 Lectures Series (No.7):Physical vs. mathematical structures: is there a difference?

Date & Time: Wed, 10 Dec., 2-4 p.m.
Venue: Rm 242, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU


About the speaker

Alexandre Guay, 比利時 魯汶大學副教授,物理學哲學家

專長:
Philosophy of Physics, Ontology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Biology, History of Science, Philosophy of Science, Evolutionary Biology, Aristotle, Behavioral Ecology

Thursday, December 04, 2014

FALL 2014 Lectures Series (No.6):從西田哲學來看現象學的「超越」問題

Date & Time: Friday, 5 Dec., 2-4 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

  本文的目標有二:首先是釐清胡塞爾與海德格對「超越」的理解並鋪陳其連續性,其次則是指出西田幾多郎對現象學的貢獻。在行文上區分為四個節次,首先(壹)筆者沿著兩重世界的區分來鋪陳超越問題,現象學對超越問題的解決線索在「意向性」。隨之(貳)我們透過胡塞爾1907年的《現象學觀念》來討論現象學對「內在」與「超越」的重新理解,並透過胡塞爾的「內在視域」與「外在視域」來闡釋包含在我們的體驗中的超越經驗。接著(參)我們討論海德格對胡塞爾的意向性的改造,如所周知,海德格將超越問題的討論引向此在的世界體驗,意向性在這裏成為此在的存在問題。筆者在這裏進一步闡釋世界的超越的意義,並且主張作為超越之最終指向的世界是「本真的世界」。最後(肆)我們從西田的立場來反省胡塞爾與海德格的現象學,筆者將批判的重點置西田的「否定的自覺」與現象學的「唯我論」問題。

About the speaker

黃文宏,德國弗萊堡大學 哲學博士,清華大學 哲學研究所所長

專長:
現象學、詮釋學、京都學派哲學

Monday, December 01, 2014

自我、知覺與意識國際工作坊VI

國立陽明大學心智哲學研究所CRG意識研究群



時間:  2014/12/26 (五)   10:30-17:10

地點:  陽明大學 活動中心第二會議室

會議議程: http://goo.gl/UTKNV9(議程有更動,請以此份為準)

報名網站:   http://goo.gl/MIIupO


主題演講者

洪裕宏 Allen  Houng (陽明大學心智哲學研究所)



邀請講者

張立鴻Li-Hung Chang (國立陽明大學人文與社會教育中心)

嚴如玉Karen Yan (國立陽明大學心智哲學研究所)

Jonathon Hricko (中央研究院歐美研究所)

林映彤 Ying-Tung Lin  (德國古騰堡大學)

邱千蕙 Lynn Chiu (美國密蘇里大學哲學系)

簡芃 Emma Chien  (加拿大亞伯達大學哲學系)