Date & Time: Friday, 3 Oct., 2-4 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU
About the theme
Recent studies on the rubber hand illusion (RHI) and full-body
illusions have engendered two outstanding issues: the relationship between
body-part and full-body ownership, and whether misrepresentation can occur in one’s sense of “experiential
ownership” (the sense that I am the one who is
having this experience). Recently my team and I conducted a series of experiments that
combined the RHI and the “body swap illusion.” The subject wore a head mounted
display (HMD) connected with a stereo camera set on the experimenter’s head. Sitting face to face, they used their right hand
holding a paintbrush to brush each other’s left hand. The subject watched
through the HMD either the experimenter’s hand from 1PP, and/or the subject’s
own hand from 3PP in the opposite direction (180°), or the subject’s full body
from 3PP (180°, with or without face). Here are our findings: (1) the
synchronous full-body conditions generate a “self-touching illusion”: many
participants felt that “I was brushing my own hand!”; (2) the
difference between the sense of body-part ownership and the sense of full-body
ownership is a matter of degree; (3) double body effect: it is possible for healthy participants to have
illusory experiences of owning two bodies; and (4) exploring the
Wittgenstein-style questions (“it was me who felt being brushed, not someone
else”), our data present a strong case against the mainstream philosophical
view called the immunity principle (IEM). The fact of experiential
ownership can be misrepresented by the subject’s pre-reflective sense of
experiential ownership. I will discuss the implications of these findings and
conclude that not
only the sense of body ownership but also the sense of experiential ownership
allow and call for interdisciplinary studies.
About the speaker
梁益堉，美國印第安納大學哲學博士，現任國立台灣大學 哲學系副教授
專長：
心智哲學、知識論、科學哲學、語言哲學、形上學、當代英美哲學專題
