About the theme
Backtracking conditionals are conditionals at least partially evaluated on the basis of preconditions or backtracking grounds of their antecedents. Inasmuch as backtracking conditionals seem to be excluded by causal and practical deliberation, it is fairly controversial that backtracking conditionals are distinct from non- backtracking conditionals. We propose a subversive thesis: all conditionals, whether counterfactual or indicative, are backtracking conditionals. On the basis of this thesis, the failure of the various attempts to establish the distinction between backtracking and non-backtracking conditionals is explained. The distinction is better characterized using a fine-grained distinction between two modes of backtracking. These modes of backtracking are further employed to resolve some puzzles about the relations between conditionals and deliberations.
About the speaker
Prof. Wang, Linton I-Chi, is an associate professor of philosophy at National Chung-Cheng University whose research is mainly in Logic, and in Philosophy of Language.
Graduate Student Association of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition at National Yang Ming University
Tuesday, April 29, 2014
Thursday, April 10, 2014
SPR 2014 Lecture Series (No.4): On scientific essentialism
About the theme
Scientific essentialism is the view, advocated and defended by Brian Ellis, Alexander Bird, and many others, which claims that laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. On this view, there is no genuine metaphysical possibility that a law of nature could fail. In this talk, I shall examine two main arguments for this necessitarian view: (i) the argument from dispositions and (ii) the argument from anti-quidditism. I shall show that neither of these arguments is successful. This leaves the traditional view (i.e., the view that laws are physical or nomic necessities weaker than metaphysical necessities) a more plausible option.
Tuesday, March 18, 2014
SPR 2014 Lecture Series (No.3): Epistemic grace- a virtue epistemological account
About the theme
In this paper the speaker argues for a new virtue epistemic account of the nature of knowledge. The account is motivated by the challenges that cases of testimonial knowledge and Barney-type cases (Barn Façade-type cases) present for existing virtue epistemic accounts of knowledge. This attempt was initially based on a non-standard reading of Gettier cases according to which it’s bad epistemic luck that is knowledge undermining. Building on this reading, the speaker argues that thinking of knowledge as requiring what he'd call epistemic grace both yields the right results in standard Gettier-type cases and Barney-type cases, and does so in a well motivated way. (adapted from the article provided below in reading material)
Tuesday, March 11, 2014
SPR 2014 Lectures Series (No.2): Is Biology an autonomous science?
About the speaker
Prof. Chou, Chen-Kung, is a professor of Biomedical Science at Chang-Gung University who specialises in signal transduction in Cellular Physiology and Tumor Biology.
Reading material
1. Mayr, Ernst "The autonomy of biology: the position of biology among sciences" Quarterly Review of Biology 71 (1996), 97-106
Friday, March 07, 2014
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