２０１５招生日程表

【聖誕快報！】

2015陽明大學心智哲學所的招生時間出爐啦～大家快來報名唷！

報名時間：2015年12月28日至2016年1月5日

筆試日期：2016年2月29日

初試合格公告：2016年3月18日

複試日期：2016年3月24日至3月27日間

複試合格公告：2016年4月12日

2015陽明心智哲學研究所招生說明會

（請大家記得先報名，方便我們統計人數哦！！報名網址：http://goo.gl/forms/Wtn0IIyE5E）

[2016年陽明心哲所招生說明會]

時間：2015年12月19日(週六) 15:00PM - 17:00PM
地點：台大心理系館北A教室(10617 臺北市羅斯福路四段一號／No. 1, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Road, Taipei，公館捷運站三號出口)

AUTUMN 2015 Lectures Series (No.7): 外在世界的懷疑論——替Dretske的理論作出形式化的辯護 (In Defense of Dretske against Holliday's Formalization)

Date & Time: Friday, 18 Dec., 3:30-5:30 p.m.

Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

為了要反駁懷疑論，Dretske建議我們反對懷疑論論證中的一個重要成分：認知封閉性原則。 Dretske同時認為，他的相關選項理論能夠證明認知運算元只是半穿透的運算元，而非全穿透的運算元。但Holliday採取了Heller的建議而對Dretske的相關選擇理論作出了形式化的工作。Holliday認為，他的形式化結果證明：Dretske的認知運算元其實不是半穿透的運算元。我在本次演講中將論證：Holliday的形式化工作並不忠於Dretske的相關選項理論。我將建議另一種新而忠實地形式化Dretske理論的方法，並證明：在我的形式化方法中，認知運算元的確如Dretske所認為的是個半穿透的運算元。我在這次報告中還將比較Dretske的理論與Heller為了解決懷疑論而提出的類似想法。

About the speaker

王文方 

陽明大學心智哲學所  所長

主要專長領域

邏輯、模態邏輯、邏輯哲學、形上學

AUTUMN 2015 Lectures Series (No.5): Computational cognitive neuroscience: From neurons to behavior

Date & Time: Friday, 27 Nov., 3:30-5:30 p.m.

Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU

About the theme

How does the brain control behavior? What do neural circuits compute? The field of cognitive neuroscience is thriving thanks to advances in neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, neuroimaging, and cognitive psychology. Given the rich set of empirical observations aggregated from these fields, an emerging challenge is to provide a unified theory that relates different levels of analysis, explaining how neural systems in the brain give rise to intelligent human behavior. Computational cognitive neuroscience addresses the above questions by studying neural representations and mechanisms from a theoretical perspective. It can offer new insights beyond brain-behavior correlations. One example is the application of machine learning/pattern recognition techniques to brain data for understanding neural representations and for developing brain-computer interfaces. Another example is the class of neural models that construct system-level architectures from the first principles, such as local computation and competitive normalization. These computational models can quantitatively simulate cognitive functions using plausible neural mechanisms and explain seemingly conflicting data in a coherent framework. In this presentation, differences among computational approaches in (cognitive) neuroscience will be contrasted. The past, present, and future of computational cognitive neuroscience will also be discussed.

About the speaker

Tsung-Ren Huang (黃從仁) 

Department of Psychology Neurobiology and Cognitive Science Center 

National Taiwan University

Workshop on Body Perception, Ownership, and Awareness(Updated)

Monday (Nov 30), National Yang-Ming University, Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Education Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, 201 & 202

International  MOST-DAAD Project “Self-Consciousness and Multisensory Integration: Philosophical and Neuroscientific Perspectives” – Workshop on Body Perception, Ownership, and Awareness

10:00-10:15 Welcome & Opening Remarks - Allen Houng (Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, NYMU)

10:15-11:00 Hong Yu Wong (Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, Philosophy of Neuroscience Group, University of Tübingen, Germany)

A Sense of Body Ownership

11:00-11:15 Discussion - Chair: Aleksandra Mroczko-Wasowicz  (Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, NYMU)

11:15-11:30 Break

11:30-12:15 Krisztina Orban (Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, Philosophy of Neuroscience Group, University of Tübingen, Germany)

Me or not me? The fundamental difference between the self and the other

12:15-12:30 Discussion - Chair: Caleb Liang (Department of Philosophy, NTU)

12:30-14:00 Round-table talks + lunch

ABSTRACTS:

Title: A Sense of Body Ownership

Hong Yu Wong

Abstract: Our bodies and our sense of embodiment are critical to our sense of ourselves as material beings (Cassam 1997, Longuenesse 2006). One prominent strand of research on embodiment concerns the sense of ownership that we have over our bodies. The key questions are how to understand this sense of ownership, and what its function is. I begin by characterising the sense of body ownership and its relation to basic forms of bodily awareness, such as proprioception (Martin 1995, de Vignemont 2007, Peacocke 2014). A major issue is the shape of a constitutive account and its status with respect to pathologies where it is compromised, such as somatoparaphrenia and alien limb syndrome (Vallar and Ronchi 2009, de Vignemont 2007 and 2011). A second question is the function of the sense of body ownership. I will focus on how the sense of body ownership affects agency and the sense of agency – in health and in pathologies such as anosognosia for hemiplegia (Berti et al. 2005, Baier and Karnath 2008, Tsakiris and Fotopoulou 2013). In this talk, I will sketch an account of body ownership that diverges from the three major accounts and discuss its significance for action and sense of agency.

Title: Me or not me? The fundamental difference between the self and the other

Krisztina Orbán

Abstract: I will argue that there are four features of the first person phenomenon which has to be accounted for in the fundamental understanding of ‘I’. The first will be the radical asymmetry between the first person perspective and third person perspective or other perspectives (2nd person). This idea has its roots in Perry’s notion of cognitive significance. The second will be privacy which can be found in Frege, Shoemaker, Evans and Recanati, but I will introduce a new version of this criterion. I will try to find what unifies any sensory experience, including experiences involving virtual reality. My notion of experience will be neutral on whether it is a perceptual experience, experience in a virtual reality set up, or another kind of experience. However, I will distinguish between internal (e.g. proprioception) and external (e.g. vision, audition, touch) experience. I will point out an asymmetry in internal and external experience in order to understand privacy. I will provide some reasons to believe that the reference fixing rule for ‘I’ cannot render any of these necessary features contingent. In light of this, I will criticize existing views on what fixes the referent of ‘I’. I will discuss the token reflexive rule for ‘I’, the fundamental reference rule for ‘I’, the demonstrative model for ‘I’ and subjectless views of ‘I’. I will show that none of them is able to account for all the necessary features of ‘I’.