【106學年度甄試招生訊息】
本年度心哲所加開了「甄試入學」的管道，不必經過折騰的邏輯與英文筆試，用備審資料來一決勝負！
──什麼是心靈與意識？神經科學與各種科學領域的進步能夠令我們更加了解心靈與意識嗎
？這些科學如何辦到這一點？人工智慧有實現的可能性嗎？
對於這些問題感興趣的你，絕對不能錯過今年度第一階段的心哲所甄試報名喔！
●甄試報名時間：105/9/27-105/10/4下午5點 (採網路報名，檢附相關資料)
●招生名額 3名
●報名應備文件
1.報名表
2.應考資格證明文件
●規定繳交資料 （請連同報名應備資料一併寄送）
1.學經歷表與自傳(一式3份)
2.大學成績單3份(1份正本、2份影本)
3.推薦函1封
4.其他有助於申請之資料(一式3份)
●初試(大學成績及備審資料之資料審查)
放榜日期：105/10/24(星期一) 放榜於本校之招生網站
(記得印出有複試時間地點的通知單歐！)
●複試(口試)
口試日期：105/11/01(星期二)
詳細資訊見以下連結：
1.陽明大學招生簡章及相關資訊下載
https://goo.gl/laizRb
2.心智哲學所甄試招生簡章
https://goo.gl/EZPDN9
歡迎加入我們，一同解開心智的奧祕！
也可以來我們的粉絲專頁，追蹤最新的消息喔↓
https://www.facebook.com/ymphilosophy/
Tuesday, September 20, 2016
Saturday, May 14, 2016
陽明心哲所FB粉專已經開張！
心哲所有FB粉絲專頁了，名義上是招生用粉專，但是也提供學期中的活動訊息、所上近況以及管理員同學的突發議題喔！
在Facebook上不僅更新方便，也有更多互動的選項。定期追蹤我們的朋友們，非常歡迎利用Facebook與我們即時聯繫，以免錯過最新的活動！
網址：https://goo.gl/Pgwwhz
【活動資訊】5/27 懷疑論工作坊
至目前為止，本學期心哲所共舉辦了兩場工作坊和一場演講。現在最後一場工作坊要來囉！
5/27星期五下午3點到6點半，由我們心哲所所長王文方老師及其愉快的夥伴──山東大學的任會明老師與中正大學的李國揚老師，共同為大家帶來以「懷疑論」(Skepticism)為主題的哲學盛宴。對知識論邏輯和悖論等領域有興趣的人，一定要來聽！
報名網址：https://goo.gl/00AZZy
詳細資訊如下：
5/27星期五下午3點到6點半，由我們心哲所所長王文方老師及其愉快的夥伴──山東大學的任會明老師與中正大學的李國揚老師，共同為大家帶來以「懷疑論」(Skepticism)為主題的哲學盛宴。對知識論邏輯和悖論等領域有興趣的人，一定要來聽！
報名網址：https://goo.gl/00AZZy
詳細資訊如下：
時間：2016/5/27 (五) 15:00~18:30
地點：陽明大學 醫學院一館 312 醫學人文圖書室 （台北市北投區立農街二段155號，捷運石牌站）
工作坊流程：
地點：陽明大學 醫學院一館 312 醫學人文圖書室 （台北市北投區立農街二段155號，捷運石牌站）
工作坊流程：
任會明 （山東大學哲學系『齊魯青年學者』特聘教授）
講題：Russell Paradox and Skepticism
講題：Russell Paradox and Skepticism
王文方 （陽明大學心智哲學研究所所長暨教授）
講題：Multiple-path vs. Single-path Solutions to Skepticism
講題：Multiple-path vs. Single-path Solutions to Skepticism
李國揚 （國立中正大學哲學系助理教授）
講題：Skepticism and Epistemic Probability
講題：Skepticism and Epistemic Probability
※ 演講結束後將舉行圓桌討論並備有輕食飲料。歡迎參加。
Thursday, December 24, 2015
２０１５招生日程表
【聖誕快報！】
2015陽明大學心智哲學所的招生時間出爐啦～大家快來報名唷！
報名時間：2015年12月28日至2016年1月5日
筆試日期：2016年2月29日
初試合格公告：2016年3月18日
複試日期：2016年3月24日至3月27日間
複試合格公告：2016年4月12日
Thursday, December 03, 2015
2015陽明心智哲學研究所招生說明會
（請大家記得先報名，方便我們統計人數哦！！報名網址：http://goo.gl/forms/Wtn0IIyE5E）
[2016年陽明心哲所招生說明會]
時間：2015年12月19日(週六) 15:00PM - 17:00PM
地點：台大心理系館北A教室(10617 臺北市羅斯福路四段一號／No. 1, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Road, Taipei，公館捷運站三號出口)
Tuesday, December 01, 2015
AUTUMN 2015 Lectures Series (No.7): 外在世界的懷疑論——替Dretske的理論作出形式化的辯護 (In Defense of Dretske against Holliday's Formalization)
Date & Time: Friday, 18 Dec., 3:30-5:30 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU
About the theme
為了要反駁懷疑論，Dretske建議我們反對懷疑論論證中的一個重要成分：認知封閉性原則。 Dretske同時認為，他的相關選項理論能夠證明認知運算元只是半穿透的運算元，而非全穿透的運算元。但Holliday採取了Heller的建議而對Dretske的相關選擇理論作出了形式化的工作。Holliday認為，他的形式化結果證明：Dretske的認知運算元其實不是半穿透的運算元。我在本次演講中將論證：Holliday的形式化工作並不忠於Dretske的相關選項理論。我將建議另一種新而忠實地形式化Dretske理論的方法，並證明：在我的形式化方法中，認知運算元的確如Dretske所認為的是個半穿透的運算元。我在這次報告中還將比較Dretske的理論與Heller為了解決懷疑論而提出的類似想法。About the speaker
王文方
陽明大學心智哲學所 所長
主要專長領域
邏輯、模態邏輯、邏輯哲學、形上學
Thursday, November 19, 2015
AUTUMN 2015 Lectures Series (No.5): Computational cognitive neuroscience: From neurons to behavior
Date & Time: Friday, 27 Nov., 3:30-5:30 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU
About the theme
How does the brain control behavior? What do neural circuits compute? The field of cognitive neuroscience is thriving thanks to advances in neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, neuroimaging, and cognitive psychology. Given the rich set of empirical observations aggregated from these fields, an emerging challenge is to provide a unified theory that relates different levels of analysis, explaining how neural systems in the brain give rise to intelligent human behavior. Computational cognitive neuroscience addresses the above questions by studying neural representations and mechanisms from a theoretical perspective. It can offer new insights beyond brain-behavior correlations. One example is the application of machine learning/pattern recognition techniques to brain data for understanding neural representations and for developing brain-computer interfaces. Another example is the class of neural models that construct system-level architectures from the first principles, such as local computation and competitive normalization. These computational models can quantitatively simulate cognitive functions using plausible neural mechanisms and explain seemingly conflicting data in a coherent framework. In this presentation, differences among computational approaches in (cognitive) neuroscience will be contrasted. The past, present, and future of computational cognitive neuroscience will also be discussed.About the speaker
Tsung-Ren Huang (黃從仁)
Department of Psychology
Neurobiology and Cognitive Science Center
National Taiwan University
Monday, November 16, 2015
Workshop on Body Perception, Ownership, and Awareness(Updated)
Monday
(Nov 30), National Yang-Ming University, Institute of Philosophy of Mind and
Cognition, Education Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, 201 & 202
International MOST-DAAD Project “Self-Consciousness and Multisensory Integration: Philosophical and Neuroscientific Perspectives” – Workshop on Body Perception, Ownership, and Awareness
10:00-10:15 Welcome & Opening Remarks - Allen Houng (Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, NYMU)
10:15-11:00 Hong Yu Wong (Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, Philosophy of Neuroscience Group, University of Tübingen, Germany)
A Sense of Body Ownership
11:00-11:15 Discussion - Chair: Aleksandra Mroczko-Wasowicz (Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, NYMU)
11:15-11:30 Break
11:30-12:15 Krisztina Orban (Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, Philosophy of Neuroscience Group, University of Tübingen, Germany)
Me or not me? The fundamental difference between the self and the other
12:15-12:30 Discussion - Chair: Caleb Liang (Department of Philosophy, NTU)
12:30-14:00 Round-table talks + lunch
ABSTRACTS:
Title: A Sense of Body Ownership
Hong Yu Wong
Hong Yu Wong
Abstract: Our bodies and our sense of embodiment are critical to our sense of ourselves as material beings (Cassam 1997, Longuenesse 2006). One prominent strand of research on embodiment concerns the sense of ownership that we have over our bodies. The key questions are how to understand this sense of ownership, and what its function is. I begin by characterising the sense of body ownership and its relation to basic forms of bodily awareness, such as proprioception (Martin 1995, de Vignemont 2007, Peacocke 2014). A major issue is the shape of a constitutive account and its status with respect to pathologies where it is compromised, such as somatoparaphrenia and alien limb syndrome (Vallar and Ronchi 2009, de Vignemont 2007 and 2011). A second question is the function of the sense of body ownership. I will focus on how the sense of body ownership affects agency and the sense of agency – in health and in pathologies such as anosognosia for hemiplegia (Berti et al. 2005, Baier and Karnath 2008, Tsakiris and Fotopoulou 2013). In this talk, I will sketch an account of body ownership that diverges from the three major accounts and discuss its significance for action and sense of agency.
Title: Me or not me? The fundamental difference between the self and the other
Krisztina Orbán
Abstract: I will argue that there are four features of the first person phenomenon which has to be accounted for in the fundamental understanding of ‘I’. The first will be the radical asymmetry between the first person perspective and third person perspective or other perspectives (2nd person). This idea has its roots in Perry’s notion of cognitive significance. The second will be privacy which can be found in Frege, Shoemaker, Evans and Recanati, but I will introduce a new version of this criterion. I will try to find what unifies any sensory experience, including experiences involving virtual reality. My notion of experience will be neutral on whether it is a perceptual experience, experience in a virtual reality set up, or another kind of experience. However, I will distinguish between internal (e.g. proprioception) and external (e.g. vision, audition, touch) experience. I will point out an asymmetry in internal and external experience in order to understand privacy. I will provide some reasons to believe that the reference fixing rule for ‘I’ cannot render any of these necessary features contingent. In light of this, I will criticize existing views on what fixes the referent of ‘I’. I will discuss the token reflexive rule for ‘I’, the fundamental reference rule for ‘I’, the demonstrative model for ‘I’ and subjectless views of ‘I’. I will show that none of them is able to account for all the necessary features of ‘I’.
Krisztina Orbán
Abstract: I will argue that there are four features of the first person phenomenon which has to be accounted for in the fundamental understanding of ‘I’. The first will be the radical asymmetry between the first person perspective and third person perspective or other perspectives (2nd person). This idea has its roots in Perry’s notion of cognitive significance. The second will be privacy which can be found in Frege, Shoemaker, Evans and Recanati, but I will introduce a new version of this criterion. I will try to find what unifies any sensory experience, including experiences involving virtual reality. My notion of experience will be neutral on whether it is a perceptual experience, experience in a virtual reality set up, or another kind of experience. However, I will distinguish between internal (e.g. proprioception) and external (e.g. vision, audition, touch) experience. I will point out an asymmetry in internal and external experience in order to understand privacy. I will provide some reasons to believe that the reference fixing rule for ‘I’ cannot render any of these necessary features contingent. In light of this, I will criticize existing views on what fixes the referent of ‘I’. I will discuss the token reflexive rule for ‘I’, the fundamental reference rule for ‘I’, the demonstrative model for ‘I’ and subjectless views of ‘I’. I will show that none of them is able to account for all the necessary features of ‘I’.
Thursday, September 24, 2015
臨時演講通知： If truth is One, logic is One: on moderate pluralism about truth and logic
Date & Time: Friday, 25 Sep., 2:30-3:30 p.m.
Venue: Rm 211, Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Yang Ming
About the theme
According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. Truth is One because there is a single truth property—truth-as-such—that applies across all truth-apt domains of discourse. Truth is Many because this truth property may be grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium-sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. In recent work Michael Lynch has suggested that a commitment to moderate truth pluralism supports logical pluralism, understood as the thesis that there are several equally legitimate notions of validity. The path from truth to logical pluralism is meant to go through Generalized Tarski’s Thesis (in the terminology of Beall and Restall (2006)): an argument is valid-X if and only if, in every case-X in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true. Since different properties ground truth in different domains and go with different types of case, different domains go with different kinds of validity. In this paper I critically examine Lynch’s argument. I suggest that Lynch fails to distinguish between rules of reasoning for truth-as-such and rules of reasoning for properties that ground truth-as-such. Taking on board this distinction I argue that there is no path from moderate alethic pluralism to logical pluralism via Generalized Tarski’s Thesis. I then go on to investigate whether there is any sense in which moderate truth pluralists can be pluralists about logic.About the speaker
Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Yonsei University
專長：
epistemology, truth, metaphysics, and philosophy of logic and mathematicsWednesday, September 23, 2015
AUTUMN 2015 Lectures Series (No.1): Early Detection of Dementia: a Neuropsychological Perspective 從臨床神經心理學的角度來研究失智症早期偵測
Date & Time: Friday, 25 Sep., 3:30-4:30 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU
About the theme
Efficient and accurate prediction of dementia such as Alzheimer’s disease in the preclinical stage is important for individual, family, social and medical reasons. In this talk, I will discuss some of the issues related to neuropsychological measurement as a key to the valid and reliable identification of persons who are at risk of developing dementia. I will also illustrate that when such efforts to more comprehensively assess neuropsychological functions are undertaken, better characterizations of spared and impaired cognitive and functional abilities result, and lead to more convincing associations with other biomarkers as well as to clinical outcomes.About the speaker
張玉玲
台大心理系助理教授
專長：
Clinical Neuropsychology／Higher cortical functioning／Use of neuroimaging(structural and functional) & behavioral paradigms to investigate individuals at high risk for Alzheimer's disease (AD) (i.e., those with Mild Cognitive Impairment and those at increased genetic risk for AD)／Cognitive function and factors related to prediction of surgical outcomes in seizure disorders／Traumatic brain injury／Brain plasticityTuesday, September 22, 2015
2015 秋季系列演講 AUTUMN 2015 Lecture Series
9/25(Fri) 台大心理系助理教授 張玉玲：Early Detection of Dementia: a Neuropsychological Perspective
從臨床神經心理學的角度來研究失智症早期偵測
10/23(Fri) 陽明大學心智哲學研究所教授 洪裕宏：意識經驗為何無解？
10/26(Mon) 阿姆斯特丹大學大學教授 Johan van Benthem:Logic in Play
(含演講前的座談會)
11/13(Fri) 南開大學哲學院教授 張曉芒：大陸高校思維素質教育的現狀
11/27(Fri) 台大心理系助理教授 黃從仁：待訂
12/4(Fri) 台大哲學系副教授王榮麟:On the Darwinian argument against moral realism
演化論者的反道德實在論論證
12/18(Fri) 陽明大學心智哲學研究所所長 王文方：In Defense of Dretske against Holliday's Formalization
1/8(Fri) 馬偕全教中心副教授 蔡承志：Some metaphysical concerns about the ethics of killing
殺人倫理學的形上學困境
Tuesday, August 18, 2015
Special Lecture: Johan van Benthem
Speaker： Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam)
Date：2015/10/26(一)
About the speaker:
Johan van Benthem為阿姆斯特丹大學的大學教授（University professor）、斯坦福大學Henry Waldgrave Stuart教授、荷蘭皇家科學院院士、歐洲科學院院士、 國際哲學學院院士。 1996年獲荷蘭國家級斯賓諾莎獎，這是自然科學和社會科學領域的最高獎項。在上世紀90年代，他創建了阿姆斯特丹大學的邏輯、語言與計算研究所（ILLC），並長期指導該研究所的工作。 ILLC是當今國際頂尖、規模最大、專門從事邏輯與語言學、計算機科學、認知科學等交叉領域研究的邏輯學研究中心。到目前為止，他撰寫了9部專著和約450篇論文，主編了4部具有權威性的邏輯手冊，他的著作已被翻譯成俄語、西班牙語、漢語等出版，在世界範圍內影響廣泛。他培養了70名博士研究生、50名碩士研究生，其中有40名博士畢業生已在世界上各國的大學成功獲得了永久職位。此外，他還在很多國際組織兼職，任多個重要英文雜誌的主編或編委。
詳細資訊將在近期公布，歡迎大家踴躍參加！
Tuesday, May 26, 2015
Thursday, May 21, 2015
SPRING 2015 Lectures Series (No.6): 人同此心，心同此理？以莊子與荀子的心智觀為例
Date & Time: Friday, 22 May., 3:30-4:30 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU
About the theme
眾所周知，「人同此心，心同此理」這一句話標誌著中國儒學（尤其是宋明心學）的思想高峰，而它如此明快，如此簡約而扼要地將「心」與「理」這兩個概念予以綰給，予以密合，而將其放入具有強烈「同一性」意涵的命題之中，其實已然可以窺知中國古代心智觀某些面向的意理信息。
而若吾人將「心同理同」此一命題上推於哲學理想的高層，並使其發顯其中難以實證實驗的意義效力，則吾人恐將可能落入中國傳統心智觀某些既定或特定的意識框架之間。由此看來，努力回返心智活動之真實歷程，而後持續地細細琢磨「心」與「理」二概念，以及其間之意理聯結，則吾人便可能有機會回到古中國心智觀內在而真實的脈絡。因此，本篇擇定先秦儒家與先秦道家兩個代表人物──荀子與莊子對心智活動所提出的哲學觀點，進而在認識主體（心）與認識範疇（理）之間，進行具認識論意趣的概念解析與系統重構。如此一來，吾人也便可以進一步對漢唐以迄宋明，一逕推擴開來的某些哲學命題，所以一直在形上學、宇宙觀、認識論與倫理實踐之學之間來回推移的緣由有所認知，有所理解，有所洞察。
About the speaker
葉海煙
成功大學中文系系主任
專長：
道家哲學研究、當代新儒學研究、中國哲學史研究
Thursday, April 16, 2015
SPRING 2015 Lectures Series (No.5): The Objectivity of Content from the Neuroscientific Point of View
Date & Time: Friday, 17 Apr., 3:30-4:30 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU
About the theme
The issue concerning the objectivity of
content is central to philosophy. Burge (2010) has recently tried to ground the
objectivity of content on an anti-individualistic conception of perceptual
content. In this talk, I shall raise some worries and inadequacies about his
psychology-based approach, and propose some ways to strengthen it with a focus
on the neuroscientific study of consciousness and intentionality such as one
undertaken by Northoff (2014a, b).
About the speaker
Kai-Yuan Cheng 鄭凱元
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang-Ming University
專長：
語言哲學、形上學、維根斯坦哲學
Thursday, April 09, 2015
SPRING 2015 Lectures Series (No.4): Memory Enhancement: A phenomenological
Date & Time: Friday, 10 Apr., 3:30-5:30 p.m.
Venue: Rm 202, Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences Education, NYMU
About the theme
The growing understanding of human mind and cognition and the development of neurotechnology have triggered the debate of cognitive enhancement in neuroethics. The talk aims to examine the normative issues of memory enhancement, and focuses on the issue of the distinction of memory treatment and enhancement. I argue that memory enhancement is distinguished from memory treatment by the demarcation of the existence of memory-related suffering. That is, memory enhancements are, under standard circumstances and without any unwilling suffering or potential suffering resulting from the alteration of memory functions, interventions that aim to manipulate memory functions based on the self-interests of the individual.
About the speaker
林映彤，德國古騰堡大學哲學博士
專長：
Philosophy of Mind; Neuroethics; Consciousness Studies; Philosophy of Cognitive Science; Memory; Cognitive Enhancement; Self-Consciousness; Delusion; Personal Identity
Thursday, April 02, 2015
國立陽明大學心智哲學研究所一零四學年度(2015)碩士班招生考試 錄取名單
320013 劉士豪 320019 陳 聆 320005 吳心萍 320017 翁晉翼 320014 蔡坦岩 320003 顏紹先
320009 蔣德萱 320016 郭心屏 320002 朱喬茵 320007 施伯靜
Monday, March 30, 2015
Wednesday, March 18, 2015
國立陽明大學心智哲學研究所 一零四學年度(2015)碩士班招生考試 初試合格名單及複試注意事項
第一梯次：09:45~10:00
320001 江聖照 320002 朱喬茵 320003 顏紹先 320004 陳宇貞
第二梯次：11:00~11:15
320005 吳心萍 320006 陳慧如 320007 施伯靜 320009 蔣德萱
第三梯次：12:45~13:00
320010 李宜潔 320012 忻之庭 320013 劉士豪 320014 蔡坦岩
第四梯次：14:15~14:30
320016 郭心屏 320017 翁晉翼 320019 陳聆 320022 張顥瀚
1.符合複試資格考生請自行上網列印複試通知，
2.請依照簡章規定，於複試舉行前二日(3/19)，將「
3.報到時，請務必攜帶複試通知函及身分證件，逾該階段報到時間
4.複試當天適逢假日本校校車停駛，
Tuesday, January 27, 2015
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